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Design analysis mechanisms for carbon auction
market through electricity market coupling
Mireille Bossy, Nadia Maïzi and Odile Pourtallier
Abstract In this paper, we analyze Nash equilibria between electricity produc-
ers selling their production on an electricity market and buying CO2 emission al-
lowances on an auction carbon market. The producers’ strategies integrate the cou-
pling of the two markets via the cost functions of the electricity production. We set
out a clear Nash equilibrium on the power market that can be used to compute equi-
librium prices on both markets as well as the related electricity produced and CO2
emissions released.
1 Introduction
The aim of this paper is to develop analytic tools in order to design a relevant mech-
anism for carbon markets, where relevant refers to emissions reduction. For this
purpose, we focus on electricity producers in a power market linked to a carbon
market. The link between markets is established through a market microstructure
approach. In this context, where the number of agents is limited, a standard game
theory applies. The producers are considered as players behaving on the two fi-
nancial markets represented here by carbon and electricity. We establish a Nash
equilibrium for this non-cooperative J-player game through a coupling mechanism
between the two markets.
The original idea comes from the French electricity sector, where the spot elec-
tricity market is often used to satisfy peak demand. Producers’ behavior is demand
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driven and linked to the maximum level of electricity production. Each producer
strives to maximize its market share. In the meantime, it has to manage the envi-
ronmental burden associated with its electricity production through a mechanism
inspired by the EU ETS1 framework: each producer emission level must be coun-
terbalanced by a permit or through the payment of a penalty. Emission permit al-
locations are simulated through a carbon market that allows the producers to buy
allowances at an auction. Our focus on the electricity sector is motivated by its in-
troduction in phase III of the EU ETS, and its prevalence in the emission share. In
the present paper, the design assumptions made on the carbon market aim to foster
emissions reduction in the entire electricity sector.
Based on a static elastic demand curve (referring to the time stages in an orga-
nized electricity market, mainly day-ahead and intra-day), we solve the local prob-
lem of establishing a non-cooperative Nash equilibrium for the two coupled markets.
While literature mainly addresses profit maximization, our share maximization
approach deals with profit by making specific assumptions, i.e. no-loss sales, and a
balance struck between the purchase of allowances and the carbon footprint of the
electricity generated. Here the market is driven through demand dynamics rather
than the electricity spot price dynamics used in recent works (see [5][4] [6]).
In Section 2, we formalize the market (carbon and electricity) rules and the asso-
ciated admissible set of players’ coupled strategies.
We start by studying (in section 3.2) the set of Nash equilibria on the electricity
market alone (see Proposition 1). This set constitutes an equivalence class (same
prices and market shares) from which we exhibit a dominant strategy.
Section 3.3 is devoted to the analysis of coupled markets equilibria: given a spe-
cific carbon market design (in terms of penalty level and allowances), we compute
the bounds of the interval where carbon prices (derived from the previous dominant
strategy) evolve. We specify the properties of the associated equilibria.
2 Coupling markets mechanism
2.1 Electricity market
In the electricity market, demand is aggregated and summarized by a function p 7→
D(p), where D(p) is the quantity of electricity that buyers are ready to obtain at
maximal unit price p. We assume the following:
Assumption 1. The demand function D(·) :R+→R+ is decreasing, left continuous,
and such that D(0) > 0.
Each producer j ∈ {1, . . . ,J} is characterized by a finite production capacity κ j
and a bounded and increasing function c j : [0,κ j]−→R
+ that associates a marginal
production cost to any quantity q of electricity. These marginal production costs
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Fig. 1 The orange curve is the function q 7→ D−1(q) on the EPEX market. The evolution of the
spot market confirms the relevance of Assumption 1 on the Demand function p 7→ D(p).
depend on several exogenous parameters reflecting the technical costs associated
with electricity production e.g. energy prices, O&M costs, taxes, carbon penalties
etc. This parameter dependency makes possible to build different market coupling
mechanisms. In the following we use it to link the carbon and electricity markets.
The merit order ranking features marginal cost functions sorted according to their
production costs. These are therefore increasing staircase functions whereby each
stair refers to the marginal production cost of a specific unit owned by the producer.
The producers trade their electricity on a dedicated market. For a given producer
j, the strategy consists in a function that makes it possible to establish an asking
price on the electricity market, defined as
s j :C j×R
+ −→ R+
(c j(·),q)−→ s j(c j(·),q),
where C j the set of marginal production cost functions are explicitly given in the
following (see (13)).
s j(c j(·),q) is the unit price at which the producer is ready to sell quantity q of
electricity. An admissible strategy carries out the following sell at no loss constraint
s j(c j(·),q)≥ c j(q), ∀q ∈ Dom(c j). (1)
For example we can take s j(c j(·),q) = c j(q) or s j(c j(·),q) = c j(q)+ λ (q), where
λ (q) stands for any additional profit.
As mentioned in the introduction, the constraint (1) guarantees profitable trade as
much as the equilibrium established through this class of strategy will benefit each
producer. This establishes a link between market share maximization and profit
maximization paradigms.
Let us denote S as the class of admissible strategy profiles on the electricity
market. We have
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S =

s = (s1, . . . ,sJ); s j : C j×R
+ −→ R+
(c j(·),q) −→ s j(c j(·),q)
such that s j(c j(·),q)≥ c j(q), ∀q ∈ Dom(c j)
 . (2)
As a function of q, s j(c j(·),q) is bounded on Dom(c j). For the sake of clarity, we
define for each q 6∈Dom(c j), s j(c j(·),q) = plolc, where plolc is the loss of load cost,
chosen as any overestimation of the maximal production costs.
For producer j’s strategy s j, we define the associated asking size at price p as
O(c j(·),s j; p) := sup{q, s j(c j(·),q) < p}. (3)
Hence O(c j(·),s j; p) is the maximum quantity of electricity at unit price p supplied
by producer j on the market.
Remark 1.
(i) The asking size function p 7→ O(c j(·),s j; p) is, with respect to p, an increasing
surjection from [0,+∞) to [0,κ j], right continuous and such that O(c j(·),s j;0) = 0.
For an increasing strategy s j, O(c j(·),s j; .) is its generalized inverse function with
respect to q.
(ii) Given two strategies q 7→ s j(c j(·),q) and q 7→ s
′
j(c j(·),q) such that s j(c j(·),q)≤
s′j(c j(·),q), for all q ∈ Dom(c j) we have for any positive p
O(c j(·),s j; p)≥O(c j(·),s
′
j; p).
Indeed, if p1 ≥ p2 then {q, s j(c j(·),q) ≤ p2} ⊂ {q, s j(c j(·),q) ≤ p1} from which
we deduce that O(c j(·),s j; ·) is increasing. Next, if s j(c j(·), ·)≤ s
′
j(c j(·), ·), for any
fixed p, we have {q, s′j(c j(·),q)≤ p} ⊂ {q, s j(c j(·),q)≤ p} from which the reverse
order follows for the requests.
We shall now describe the electricity market clearing. Note that from a market
view point, the dependency of the supply with respect to the marginal cost does not
need to be explicit. For the sake of clarity, we write s j(q) and O(s j; p) instead of
s j(c j(·),q), O(c j(·),s j; p). The dependency will be expressed explicitly whenever
needed.
By aggregating the J asking size functions, we can define the overall asking
function p 7→ O (s; p) a producer strategy profile s = (s1, . . . ,sJ) as:
O (s; p) =
J
∑
j=1
O(s j; p). (4)
Hence, for any producer strategy profile s, O (s; p) is the quantity of electricity that
can be sold on the market at unit price p.
The overall supply function p 7→O (s; p) is an increasing surjection defined from
[0,+∞) to [0,∑Jj=1 κ j], such that O (s;0) = 0.
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2.1.1 Electricity market clearing
Taking producer strategy profile s = (s1(·), . . . ,sJ(·)) the market sets the electricity
market price pelec(s) together with the quantities (ϕ1(s), . . . ,ϕJ(s)) of electricity
sold by each producer.
The market clearing price pelec(s) is the unit price paid to each producer for the
quantities ϕ j(s) of electricity. The price p(s) may be defined as a price whereby
supply satisfies demand. As we are working with a general non-increasing demand
curve (possibly locally inelastic), the price that satisfies the demand is not necessar-
ily unique. We thus define the clearing price generically with the following defini-
tion.
Definition 1 (The clearing electricity price). Let us define
p(s) = inf{p> 0; O (s; p) > D(p)}
and
p¯(s) = sup{p ∈ [p(s), plolc];D(p) = D(p(s))}
(5)
with the convention that inf /0 = plolc. The clearing price may then be established as
any pelec(s) ∈ [p(s), p¯(s)] as an output of a specific market clearing rule. To keep
the price consistency, the market rule must be such that for any two strategy profiles
s and s′,
if p(s) < p(s′) then pelec(s) < pelec(s′),
if p(s) = p(s′) then pelec(s) = pelec(s′).
(6)
Note that p(s) 6= p¯(s) only if the demand curve p 7→ D(p) is constant on some
intervals [p(s), p(s)+ ε].
0
price
quantity
•
•
•
•
•
Total offer p 7→ O (p)
•
•
Demand p 7→ D(p)
•
•
•
•
•
•
p(s)
•
p¯(s)
•quantity sold
Fig. 2 Electricity clearing price p(s) and p¯(s).
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Note also that price p(s) is well defined in the case where demand does not
strictly decrease. This includes the case where demand is constant. In such case,
p(s) = plolc only if the demand curve never crosses the supply.
Next, we define the quantity of electricity sold at price pelec(s). WhenO (s; pelec(s))≤
D(pelec(s)), each producer sells O(s j; p
elec(s)), but cases where O (s; pelec(s)) >
D(pelec(s)) may occur, requiring the introduction of an auxiliary rule to share
D(pelec(s)) among the producers that propose O (s; pelec(s)). Note that in this last
case, due to the clearing property (6) on pelec(·), we have
O (s; p(s))≥ D(pelec(s)) = D(p(s)).
Hence the D(pelec(s)) is totally provided by producers with non null offer at price
p(s). The rule of the market is to share D(pelec(s)) among these producers only.
This gives an explicit priority to the best offer prices p(s).
Let us break down supply as follows:
O (s; p(s)) =
J
∑
j=1
O(s j; p(s)
−)+
J
∑
j=1
∆−O(s j; p(s)),
where ∆−O(s j; p(s)) := O(s j; p(s))−O(s j; p(s)
−).
The market’s choice is to fully accept the asking size of producers with contin-
uous asking size curve at point p(s). For producers with discontinuous asking size
curve at p(s), a market rule based on proportionality that favors abundance is used
to share the remaining part of the supply. We resume the market rule on quantities
as follows.
Definition 2 (Clearing electricity quantities). The quantity ϕ j(s) of electricity
sold by Producer j on the electricity market is
ϕ j(s) =

O(s j; p
elec(s)),
if D(pelec(s))≥O (s; pelec(s)),
O(s j; p(s)
−)+∆−O(s j; p(s))
D(p(s))−O (s; p(s)−)
∆−O (s; p(s))
,
if D(pelec(s)) < O (s; p(s)),
(7)
where ∆−O (s; p(s)) := ∑Jj=1 ∆
−O(s j; p(s)) > 0.
Note that, when D(p(s)) < O (s; p(s)), we have ∆−O (s; p(s)) > 0. Note also that
we always have
J
∑
i=1
ϕ j(s) = D(p
elec(s))∧O (s; pelec(s)). (8)
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2.2 Carbon market
Let us recall the CO2 regulation principle on which we base our analysis. Produc-
ers are penalized according to their emission level if they do not own allowances.
Hence, in parallel to their position on the electricity market, producers buy CO2
emission allowances on a separate CO2 auction market.
In the following, we formalize producer strategy on the CO2 market only.
Assumption 2 (Capped carbon market).
(i) The carbon market is capped and has a finite known quantity Ω of CO2 emission
allowances available.
(ii) Each producer j can buy a capped number of allowances E j, related to its own
CO2 emission capacity.
(iii) Emissions that are not covered by allowances are penalized at a unit rate p.
On this market, producers adopt a strategy that consists in an offer function τ 7→
A j(τ) defined from [0,p] to [0,E j]. Quantity A j(τ) is the quantity of allowances that
producer j is ready to buy at price τ . This offer may not be a monotonic function.
We denote❆ the strategy profile set on the CO2 market,
❆ := {A = (A1, . . . ,AJ); s.t. Ak : [0,p]→ [0,E j]}.
The CO2 market reacts by aggregating the J offers by
A (τ) :=
J
∑
j=1
A j(τ),
and the clearing market price is established following a second item auction2 as:
pCO2(A) := sup{τ;A (τ) > Ω}, with the convention sup /0 = 0. (9)
Note that pCO2(A) = 0 indicates that there are too many allowances to sell. It is
worth a reminder here that the aim of allowances is to decrease emissions. In section
3.3, we discuss a design hypothesis (Assumption 6) that guarantees an equilibrium
price pCO2(A) > 0. Therefore, in the following, we assume that the overall quantity
Ω of allowances, is such that pCO2(A) > 0.
Next, we define the amount of allowances bought at price pCO2(A) by the produc-
ers. By Definition (9), we have A (pCO2(A)) ≥ Ω and A (pCO2(A)+) ≤ Ω . When
A (pCO2(A)) > Ω , the CO2 market must decide between the producers with an ad-
ditional rule. We define
∆(Ai) := Ai(p
CO2(A)+)−Ai(p
CO2(A)).
2 Also called Dutch auction market with several units to sell, in a second item auction market, the
seller begins with a very high price and reduces it. The price is lowered until a bidder accepts the
current price.
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For a producer i, ∆(Ai) ≥ 0 means that its CO2 demand does not decrease if
the price increases. It is therefore ready to pay more to obtain the quantity of al-
lowances it is asking for at price pCO2(A). The CO2 market gives priority to this kind
of producer, which will be fully served. The producers such that ∆(A j) < 0 share
the remaining allowances. This can be written as follows.
Each producers with A j(p
CO2(A)) > 0 obtains the following quantity δ j(A) of
allowances
δ j(A) :=

A j(p
CO2(A)), if ∆(A j)≥ 0,
A j(p
CO2(A)+)+
(−∆(A j))
+
J
∑
i=1
(−∆(Ai))
+
(
Ω −
J
∑
i=1
Ai(p
CO2(A))✶{∆(Ai)≥0}
)
,
otherwise.
(10)
2.3 Carbon and electricity market coupling
In the following, we formalize the coordination of a producer’s strategy on the CO2
and electricity markets.
As mentioned earlier, for each producer, the marginal cost function is parametrized
by the positions A of the producers on the carbon market. Indeed, producer j can
obtain CO2 emission allowances on the market to avoid penalization for (some of)
its emissions. Those emissions that are not covered by allowances are penalized at
a unit rate p.
A profile of an offer to buy from the producers A = (A1, . . . ,AJ), through the
CO2 market clearing, corresponds to a unit price of p
CO2(A) of the allowance and
quantities δ j(A) of allowances bought by each producer (defined by the market rules
(9),(10)).
The following minimal assumption on the CO2 emission related to the electricity
production will be restricted in Assumption 4.
Assumption 3. We assume that for all producers { j = 1, . . . ,J}, the emission rate
(originally in CO2 t/Mwh) q 7→ e j(q) is positive.
For each producer, we fix the maximal amount E j of allowances to buy to∫ κ j
0 e j(z)dz.
Then, the marginal production cost function cAj (·), parametrized by the emission
regulations, comes out as
q 7→ cAj (q) =
{
c j(q)+ e j(q)p
CO2(A), for q ∈ [0,κ
CO2
j ∧κ j]
c j(q)+ e j(q)p, for q ∈ [κ
CO2
j ∧κ j,κ j]
(11)
where κ
CO2
j is such that
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∫ κCO2j
0
e j(z)dz = δ j(A)
and where c j(·) stands for the marginal production cost without any emission regu-
lation.
Remark 2. The results stated in Section 3.3 remain valid when the CO2 regulation
forbids uncovered electricity production. This strengthened regulation rule leads to
the following marginal production cost function
q 7→ cAj (q) = c j(q)+ e jp
CO2(A), for q ∈ [0,κ
CO2
j ∧κ j].
In this coupled market setting, the strategy of producer j thus makes a pair
(A j,s j). The set of admissible strategy profile is defined as
Σ= {(A,s); A ∈❆, s ∈ S} , (12)
where in the definition of S in (2), we use
C j =
{
cAj ; A ∈❆
}
. (13)
Prices for allowances and electricity, pCO2((A,s)) and pelec((A,s)), quantities of
allowances bought by each producer, δ j((A,s)) and market shares on electricity
market ϕ j((A,s)) of each producer corresponds to any strategy profile (A,s) ∈ Σ,
through the market mechanisms described.
3 Nash Equilibrium analysis
3.1 Definition
We suppose that the J producers behave non cooperatively, aiming at maximizing
their individual market share on the electricity market. For a strategy profile (A,s)∈
Σ, the market share of a producer j depends upon its strategy (A j,s j(·)) but also on
the strategies (A− j,s− j) of the other producers
3. In this set-up the natural solution
is the Nash equilibrium (see e.g. [1]). More precisely we are looking for a strategy
profile
(A∗,s∗) = ((A∗1,s
∗
1), · · · ,(A
∗
J ,s
∗
J)) ∈ Σ
that satisfies Nash equilibrium conditions: none of the producers would strictly ben-
efit, that is, would strictly increase its market share from a unilateral deviation.
Namely, for any producer j strategy (A j,s j) such that ((A
∗
− j,s
∗
− j);(A j,s j)) ∈ Σ,
we have 4
3 Here v− j stands for the profile (vi, · · · ,v j−1,v j+1, · · · ,vJ).
4 (v− j;v) stands for (v1, · · ·v j−1,v,v j+1, · · ·vJ)
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ϕ j((A
∗,s∗))≥ ϕ j((A
∗
− j,s
∗
− j);(A j,s j)), (14)
where ϕ j is the quantity of electricity sold. Note that the dependency in terms of A
through the marginal cost cAj is now explicit in ϕ j.
Condition (14) has to be satisfied for any unilateral deviation of any producer j.
In particular (14) has to be satisfied for a producer j admissible deviation (A∗j ,s j)
such that ((A∗− j,s
∗
− j);(A
∗
j ,s j))∈Σwhere producer j would only change its behavior
on the electricity market. Consequently,
Remark 3. The electricity strategy component s∗ of the Nash equilibrium (A∗,s∗)
is also a Nash equilibrium for the restricted electricity game, where producers only
behave on the electricity market with marginal electricity production costs cA
∗
j (·),
j = 1, · · ·J.
The next section focuses on determining a Nash equilibrium on the game re-
stricted to the electricity market.
3.2 Equilibrium on the power market
In this restricted set-up, we consider that the marginal costs {c j, j = 1 . . . ,J} are
known data, possibly fixed through the positionA on the CO2 market. In this section,
we refer to S as the set of admissible strategy profiles, in the particular case where
C j = {c j} for each j = 1, . . . ,J.
The Nash equilibrium problem is as follows: find a strategy profile s∗ =(s∗1, . . . ,s
∗
J)∈
S such that
∀ j,∀ s j 6= s
∗
j , ϕ j(s
∗)≥ ϕ j(s
∗
− j;s j). (15)
The following proposition exhibits a Nash equilibrium, whereby each producer
must choose the strategy denoted byC j, and referred to as marginal production cost
strategy. It is defined by
C j(q) =
{
c j(q), for q ∈ Dom(c j)
plolc, for q 6∈ Dom(c j).
(16)
Proposition 1.
(i) For any strategy profile s = (s1, . . . ,sJ), no producer j ∈ {1, . . . ,J} can be pe-
nalized by deviating from strategy s j to its marginal production cost strategy C j,
namely,
ϕ j(s)≤ ϕ(s− j;C j). (17)
In other words, for any producer j, C j is a dominant strategy.
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(ii) The strategy profile C = (C1, . . .CJ) is a Nash equilibrium.
(iii) If the strategy profile s ∈ S is a Nash equilibrium, then we have pelec(s) =
pelec(C) and for any producer j, ϕ j(s) = ϕ j(C).
Point (ii) of the previous proposition is a direct consequence of the dominance
property (i). The proof of both (i) and (iii) can be found in [3]. Point (ii) of the
proposition exhibits a Nash equilibrium strategy profile. Clearly this equilibrium is
not unique since we can easily show that a producer’s given supply can follow from
countless different strategies. Nevertheless point (iii) shows that for any Nash equi-
librium, the associated electricity prices are the same and the quantity of electricity
bought by any producer j is the same for all equilibrium profiles.
Proof. We prove the dominance property (i). Suppose that one producer, let us say
producer 1, deviates and chooses C1 instead of s1. We have to show that its market
share cannot be reduced by this deviation. By definition of the admissibility (see
Equation (2) we have
s1(q)≥C1(q),∀q ∈ [0,κ1].
Hence the offer functions defined by (3) satisfy
O(s1; ·)≤O(C1; ·).
And by adding the unchanged offers of the other producers
O ((s−1,s1); ·)≤O ((s−1,C1); ·), (18)
where (s−1;C1) denotes the strategy profile that includes producer 1 deviation. The
minimum market clearing price (5) for strategy profile s is :
p(s) = inf{p, O (s; p) > D(p)}.
The minimum market clearing price (5) for strategy profile (s−1,C1) is :
p((s−1;C1)) = inf{p, O ((s−1;C1); p) > D(p)}
The inequality (18) together with the fact that the demand D(·) is a decreasing func-
tion imply that
p((s−1;C1))≤ p(s).
From which, together with (6) we deduce that
pelec((s−1;C1))≤ p
elec(s).
Now let us show that producer 1 does not reduce its market share by deviating
from s1(·) toC1(·) , that is that
ϕ1(s−1,C1)≥ ϕ1(s).
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For the sake of clarity we adopt, in this paragraph, the following notation:
ps := p(s)
pelecs := p
elec(s)
p¯s := p¯(s)
and
psC := p((s−1;C1))
pelecsC := p
elec((s−1;C1))
p¯sC := p¯((s−1;C1))
We first consider the case where pelecsC < p
elec
s .
By definition of the minimum clearing price psC, the fact that D(ps) ≤ D(psC) and
the fact that O ((s−1;C1); ·) is non-decreasing, we have
D(ps)≤ D(psC)≤O ((s−1;C1); psC)≤O ((s−1;C1); p
elec
sC )≤O ((s−1;C1); p¯sC)
Hence, for any pis ∈ {ps, p
elec
s , p¯s} and any pisC ∈ {psC, p
elec
sC , p¯sC} we have
D(pis)≤O ((s−1;C1);pisC).
Since D(pis)≤ D(pisC), we have
D(pis)≤O ((s−1;C1);pisC)∧D(pisC),
and finally
O ((s−1;s1),pis)∧D(pis)≤O ((s−1;C1);pisC)∧D(pisC).
From the market clearing we get
ϕ1(s−1,s1)−ϕ1(s−1,C1) =O ((s−1;s1), p
elec
s )∧D(p
elec
s )−O ((s−1;C1); p
elec
sC )∧D(p
elec
sC )
+ ∑
j>1
(ϕ j(s−1,C1)−ϕ j(s−1,s1)) .
Let us denote
E (pelecs ) =
{
j ∈ {2, . . . ,J} s.t. ∆−O(s j; p
elec
s ) > 0
}
.
We have
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ϕ1(s−1;s1)−ϕ1(s−1;C1) =O ((s−1;s1); p
elec
s )∧D(p
elec
s )−O ((s−1;C1); p
elec
sC )∧D(p
elec
sC )
+ ∑
j>1, j/∈E (pelecs )
(
ϕ j(s−1;C1)−O(s j; p
elec
s )
)
+ ∑
j>1, j∈E (pelecs )
(ϕ j(s−1;C1)−ϕ j(s−1;s1))
≤O ((s−1;s1); p
elec
s )∧D(p
elec
s )−O ((s−1;C1); p
elec
sC )∧D(p
elec
sC )
+ ∑
j>1, j/∈E (pelecs )
(
O(s j; p
elec
sC )−O(s j; p
elec
s )
)
+ ∑
j>1, j∈E (pelecs )
(ϕ j(s−1;C1)−ϕ j(s−1;s1))
Since pelecsC ≤ p
elec
s we get
ϕ1(s−1;s1)−ϕ1(s−1;C1)≤ ∑
j>1 j∈E (pelecs )
(ϕ j(s−1;C1)−ϕ j(s−1;s1))
But for any j ∈ E (pelecs ), the quantity O(s j; p
−
s )≤ ϕ j(s−1;s1). Hence since psC < ps
and O(s j; ·) is non decreasing, we get
O(s j; p
−
sC)≤O(s j; p
−
s )≤ ϕ j(s−1;s1).
For such j > 1 we thus have
ϕ j(s−1;C1)−ϕ j(s−1;s1)≤ϕ j(s−1;C1)−O(s j; p
elec
s
−
)≤ϕ j(s−1;C1)−O(s j; p
elec
sC )≤ 0.
from which it follows that
ϕ1(s−1;s1)−ϕ1(s−1;C1)≤ 0.
Now consider the case where pelecs = p
elec
sC := p
elec.
Due to the rule (6), we necessarily have ps = psC := p.
• If O ((s−1,s1); p
elec)≤O ((s−1,C1); p
elec)≤ D(pelec),
hence by the market clearing
ϕ1(s−1;s1) = O(s1; p
elec)≤O(C1; p
elec) = ϕ1(s−1;C1).
• If O ((s−1;s1); p
elec)≤ D(pelec)≤O ((s−1;C1); p
elec),
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ϕ1(s−1;s1) = O(s1; p
elec)≤D(pelec)− ∑
j>1
ϕ j(s−1;s1)
= D(pelec)− ∑
j>1
O(s j; p
elec)
≤D(pelec)− ∑
j>1
ϕ j(s−1;C1) = ϕ1(s−1;C1).
• If D(pelec)≤O ((s−1,s1); p
elec)≤O ((s−1,C1); p
elec),
by the market clearing we get
ϕ1(s−1;s1)−ϕ1(s−1;C1) =O ((s−1;s1), p
elec)∧D(pelec)−O ((s−1;C1); p
elec)∧D(pelec)
+ ∑
j>1
(ϕ j(s−1;C1)−ϕ j(s−1;s1))
≤∑
j>1
(ϕ j(s−1;C1)−ϕ j(s−1;s1))
≤ ∑
j>1, j∈E (pelec)
(ϕ j(s−1;C1)−ϕ j(s−1;s1)).
From (7), we have for j ∈ E (p¯)
ϕ j(s−1;s1) = O(s j, p
−)+∆−O(s j; p¯)
(D(p¯)−O ((s−1;s1), p
−))
∆−O ((s−1;s1), p¯)
and
ϕ j(s−1;C1) = O(s j; p
−)+∆−O(s j; p¯)
(D(p¯)−O ((s−1;C1); p
−))
∆−O ((s−1;C1); p¯)
.
Hence, if E (p¯) is non empty then at least one producer exists, j 6= 1 such that
∆−O(s j; p¯) > 0. and from the desegregation of O and definition of ∆
− it results
that
ϕ1(s−1;s1)−ϕ1(s−1;C1)
= ∑
j>1, j∈E (p¯)
∆−O(s j, p¯)
(
(D(p¯)−O (s−1; p
−)−O(C1; p
−))
O ((s−1;C1); p¯)−O (s−1; p
−)−O(C1; p
−)
−
(D(p¯)−O (s−1, p
−)−O(s1, p
−))
O ((s−1,s1), p¯)−O (s−1; p
−)−O(s1; p
−)
)
We note that
0< O ((s−1;s1); p¯)−O (s−1; p
−)−O(C1; p
−)
≤O ((s−1;C1); p¯)−O (s−1; p
−)−O(C1; p
−)
and that D(p¯)−O ((s−1;C1); p
−) > 0 by assumption. Then
Carbon auction market design through electricity market coupling 15
ϕ1(s−1;s1)−ϕ1(s−1;C1)
≤ ∑
j>1, j∈E (p¯)
∆−O(s j; p¯)×
(
(D(p¯)−O (s−1; p¯−)−O(C1; p¯−))
O ((s−1;s1); p¯)−O (s−1; p
−)−O(C1; p
−)
−
(D(p¯)−O (s−1; p¯−)−O(s1; p¯−))
O ((s−1;s1); p¯)−O (s−1; p
−)−O(s1; p
−)
)
Since D(p¯)≤O ((s−1;s1); p¯) and O(C1; p
−)≥O(s1; p
−), we can deduce that
ϕ1(s−1;s1)−ϕ1(s−1;C1)≤ 0.
This follows from the fact that x 7→
A− x
B− x
with A≤ B, is decreasing with respect to
x. ⊓⊔
3.3 Coupled market design using the Nash equilibrium
From this point we restrict our attention to a particular market design. In the fol-
lowing, the scope of the analysis applies to a special class of producers, a specific
electricity market price clearing (satisfying Definition 1) and a range of quantities Ω
of allowances available on the CO2 market. Although not necessary, the following
restriction simplifies the development.
Assumption 4. On the producers. Each producer j operates a single production
unit, for which
(i) The marginal cost contribution that does not depend on the producer positions
A in the CO2 market is constant, q 7→ c j(q) = c j. The related emission rate q 7→
e j(q) = e j is also assumed to be a positive constant.
(ii) The producers are different pairwise: ∀i, j ∈ {1, · · ·J},(ci,ei) 6= (c j,e j).
For each producer, the maximal amount E j of allowances to buy is now e jκ j.
As a consequence of Assumption 4, the marginal production cost in (11) simply
writes as
q 7→ cAj (q) =

c j + e jp
CO2(A), for q ∈ [0,
δ j(A)
e j
∧κ j]
c j + e jp, for q ∈ [
δ j(A)
e j
∧κ j,κ j]
(19)
For a given strategy profile on the electricity market, Definition 1 gives a range of
possible determinations for the electricity price. Previously, the analysis of the Nash
Equilibrium restricted to the electricity market did not require a precise clearing
price determination. Nevertheless to extend our analysis of the coupling we need to
explicit this determination and assume the following:
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Assumption 5. On the electricity market. For a given strategy profile s of the pro-
ducers, the clearing price of electricity is pelec(s). The market rule fixes pelec(·) =
p¯(·) or pelec(·) = p(·) as defined in (5).
We will illustrate below that this choice of clearing price ensures the increasing
behavior of pelec(·) in terms of the carbon price (see Lemma 1).
The quantity Ω of CO2 allowances available on the market plays a crucial role
in the market design. As a matter of fact, if this quantity is too high, its market
price will drop to zero, leaving the market incapable of fulfilling its role of decreas-
ing CO2 emissions. Therefore we clearly need to make an assumption that restricts
the number of allowances available. Capping the maximum quantity of allowances
available requires information on which producers are willing to obtain allowances.
This is the objective of the following paragraph where we define a willing to buy
function that plays a central role in the analysis of Nash equilibria.
3.3.1 Willing to buy functions
In this paragraph, we aim at guessing a Nash equilibrium candidate. We base our
reasoning on the dominant strategies on the electricity market alone (see Propo-
sition 1). Remark 3 allows us to fix the electricity market strategy as a marginal
production cost strategy, given the marginal cost functions CA = {cAj , j = 1, . . .J}
imposed by the output of the CO2 clearing, as in (19).
In particular, when A ∈❆, we observe that the strategies (A,{cAj , j = 1, . . .J})
are in the set of admissible strategies defined in (12).
From now on, all the strategy profiles that we consider on the carbon market are
assumed to be admissible.
In the following, as the discussion will mainly focus on the impact of strategies
A through the carbon market, we denote the electricity market output as:
pelec(A) instead of pelec(CA)
(ϕ1(A), . . . ,ϕJ(A)) instead of (ϕ1(C
A), . . . ,ϕJ(C
A)).
(20)
To begin with, we consider an exogenous CO2 cost τ similar to a CO2 tax: the
producers’ marginal cost becomes for any τ ∈ [0,p], cτj (·),
cτj (q) = c j + τe j, for q ∈ [0,κ j], j = 1, . . . ,J.
In this tax framework, the dominant strategy on the electricity market is also
parametrized by τ as Cτ = {cτj , j = 1, . . .J} defined in (16). The clearing electricity
price and quantities derive as
pelec(τ) = pelec(Cτ)
(ϕ1(τ), . . . ,ϕJ(τ)) = (ϕ1(C
τ), . . . ,ϕJ(C
τ)).
(21)
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Price pelec(τ) will be referred to as the taxed electricity price, by contrast with price
pelec(A) issued from the marginal production cost strategy that results from the
position A on the carbon market.
Remark 4. Considering a carbon tax τ and a carbon market strategy A such that
τ = pCO2(A), we emphasize the fact that the corresponding electricity prices are not
equivalent, but we always have the following inequality
pelec(τ)≤ pelec(A).
This comes from the fact that Cτ and CA differ only on the width of their steps, and
that O(cAi ; ·)≤O(c
τ
i ; ·).
We start with the following, the proof of which is set out at the end of this sub-
section:
Lemma 1. Under Assumption 5, the map τ 7→ pelec(τ) is increasing and right con-
tinuous.
We determine the willing-to-buy-allowances functions W j(·) and W (·), as follows:
W j(τ) = e jϕ j(τ) and W (τ) =
J
∑
j=1
W j(τ) (22)
For producer j, W j is the quantity of emissions it would produce under the penaliza-
tion τ , and consequently the quantity of allowances it would be ready to buy at price
τ . Given the CO2 value τ , the total amount W (τ) represents the allowances needed
to cover the global emissions generated by the players who have won electricity
market shares. We also define the functions
W j(τ) = e jκ j✶{ϕ j(τ)>0}, and W (τ) =
J
∑
j=1
W j(τ) (23)
Given that the CO2 value τ , W (τ) is the amount of allowances needed by the pro-
ducers who have won electricity market shares and want to cover their overall pro-
duction capacity κ j. Obviously we have
W (τ)≤W (τ), ∀τ ∈ [0,p].
We now can state our last design assumption
Assumption 6. On the carbon market design. The available allowances Ω satisfy
W (p) < Ω < W (0).
Assumption 6 allows us to define two prices of particular interest for the con-
struction of the equilibrium strategy:
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τ lower = sup{τ ∈ [0,p] s.t. W (τ) > Ω}, (24)
and
τhigher = sup{τ ∈ [0,p] s.t. W (τ) > Ω}. (25)
Observe that we always have τ lower ≤ τhigher.
Lemma 2. The function τ 7→W (τ) is non increasing:
W (t ′)≤W (t), ∀ 0≤ t < t ′ ≤ p.
We end this subsection by successively giving the proofs of Lemmas 1 and 2.
Proof of Lemma 1. Although the result of this lemma is intuitive, the proof is rather
technical. This is due to our assumptions, in particular regarding demand, that allow
the demand function to have discontinuity points and some non-elasticity areas (see
Assumption 1).
More precisely, if we define the map τ 7→ O (τ; p) by
O (τ; p) =
J
∑
i=1
O(Cτj (·); p) =
J
∑
i=1
κi✶{p≥ci+τei} =
J
∑
i=1
κi✶{τ≤ p−ciei }
,
then we can observe that, for any p> 0 far enough from the ci, for any ε ≥ 0
O (τ + ε; p)≤O (τ; p)
and
lim
ε→0,ε>0
O (τ + ε; p) = O (τ; p).
We call SD = {pd ; limε→0;ε>0D(pd +ε)<D(pd)}, the set of discontinuity points
of the Demand function.
We call Sκ = {pc;D(pc) = ∑κi}, the set of prices that make demand coincide
with some accumulation of production capacities.
We observe that pelec(τ) ∈ {ci + τei, i = 1, . . . , j}∪ SD ∪ Sκ . In particular, from
Definition 1,
p(τ) = inf{p> 0;O (τ; p) > D(p)},
and we obtain that
D(p(τ + ε))≤O (τ + ε; p(τ + ε))≤O (τ; p(τ + ε))
from which we conclude that p(τ + ε)≥ p(τ).
Now we prove the right continuity of τ 7→ p(τ). Let us fix a τ .
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(i) We first consider the case D(p(τ)) < O (τ; p(τ)).
This means that p(τ) is of the form cℓ + τℓ, for a given ℓ. Then when ε > 0 is
small enough, we also have p(τ + ε) = cℓ +(τ + ε)eℓ. Indeed, D(cℓ +(τ + ε)eℓ)≤
D(cℓ + τeℓ) and for a small enough ε ,
O (τ;cℓ + τeℓ) = κℓ +∑
i6=ℓ
κi✶{τ≤ cℓ−ci
1−ei/eℓ
}= O (τ + ε;cℓ +(τ + ε)eℓ)
Thus, D(cℓ+(τ +ε)eℓ)<O (τ +ε;cℓ+(τ +ε)eℓ) which implies that p(τ)+eℓε =
cℓ +(τ + ε)eℓ ≥ p(τ + ε) and hence
eℓε ≥ p(τ + ε)− p(τ).
(ii) We consider next the case D(p(τ)) > O (τ; p(τ)).
This means that p(τ) ∈ SD is at a discontinuity point, say pd of the demand, p(τ) =
pd . Then, for any δ > 0,
D(p(τ)+δ ) < O (τ; p(τ)+δ ).
But,
O (τ; pd +δ ) =
J
∑
i=1
κi✶
{τ≤
pd+δ−ci
ei
}
and we can choose δ to be small enough so that τ 6= pd+δ−ci
ei
. Then, for a small
enough ε ,
D(p(τ)+δ ) < O (τ; p(τ)+δ ) = O (τ + ε; p(τ)+δ )
which implies that p(τ)+δ ≥ p¯(τ + ε), so we obtain
δ ≥ p(τ + ε)− p(τ)≥ 0.
(iii) We consider now the case D(p(τ)) = O (τ; p(τ)).
This means that p(τ) ∈ Sκ , say p(τ) = pc Then, for any δ > 0,
D(p(τ)+δ ) < O (τ; p(τ)+δ ).
But,
O (τ; pc +δ ) =
J
∑
i=1
κi✶
{τ≤
pc+δ−ci
ei
}
and we can choose δ small enough such that τ 6= pc+δ−ci
ei
. Then, for ε small enough,
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D(p(τ)+δ ) < O (τ; p(τ)+δ ) = O (τ + ε; p(τ)+δ )
which implies that p(τ)+δ ≥ p(τ + ε), so we get
δ ≥ p(τ + ε)− p(τ)≥ 0.
The right-continuity of τ 7→ p¯(τ) follows, by definition as p¯(τ) is a continuous
transformation of p(τ). ⊓⊔
Proof of Lemma 2. The proof consists in a complete analysis of the entire combina-
tion of situations, but each situation is elementary. We present some cases here, but
we relegate the rest in the appendix.
Let us suppose the opposite, that is there exists 0 ≤ t < t ′ ≤ p such that the
emission levels are W (t ′) > W (t).
We define the function τ 7→ I(τ) valued in the subsets of {1, . . . ,J} that lists the
producers in the electricity market producing at tax level τ:
i ∈ I(τ) if ϕi(τ) > 0.
In particular we have for all τ ∈ [0,p],
W (τ) = ∑
i∈I(τ)
eiϕi(τ).
(i) We first examine the situation I(t ′) = I(t).
To shorten the expressions, we adopt the following shorten notation
I(t) = I and I(t ′) = I′.
(i-a) If ∑i∈I ϕi(t) =D(t) then, from the demand constraint (DC) and the emission
levels hypothesis (EH), we have
∑
i∈I
ϕi(t) = D(t)≥ D(t
′)≥ ∑
i∈I′
ϕi(t
′) (DC)
∑
i∈I
ϕi(t)ei < ∑
i∈I′
ϕi(t
′)ei. (EH)
We denote by Î the subset of I of index such that ci + tei = p(t). In particular, when
j ∈ I \ Î, then ϕ j(t) = κ j.
Note that there exists at most one index (say ℓ) in the set Î ∩ Î′. If j ∈ Î \ Î′, if
k ∈ Î′ \ Î, then, by the definition of the sets
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c j + e jt =cℓ + eℓt
c j + e jt
′ <cℓ + eℓt
′
ck + ekt <c j + e jt
ck + ekt
′ =cℓ + eℓt
′
ck + ekt <cℓ + eℓt
c j + e jt
′ <ck + ekt
From which, we easily deduce that
max{e j, j ∈ Î \ Î′}< eℓ <min{ek,k ∈ Î′ \ Î}. (26)
Now, we decompose the sets I and I′ in the demand constraint (DC) and the
emission levels hypothesis (EH) as follows:
∑
n∈I\Î∪Î′
κn +ϕℓ(t)+ ∑
i∈Î\Î′
ϕi(t)+ ∑
k∈Î′\Î
κk
≥ ∑
n∈I\Î∪Î′
κn +ϕℓ(t
′)+ ∑
i∈Î\Î′
κi + ∑
k∈Î′\Î
ϕk(t
′) (DC)
∑
n∈I\Î∪Î′
enκn + eℓϕℓ(t)+ ∑
i∈Î\Î′
eiϕi(t)+ ∑
k∈Î′\Î
ekκk
< ∑
n∈I\Î∪Î′
enκn + eℓϕℓ(t
′)+ ∑
i∈Î\Î′
eiκi + ∑
k∈Î′\Î
ekϕk(t
′) (EH) .
After simplification, we obtain
ϕℓ(t)+ ∑
i∈Î\Î′
ϕi(t)+ ∑
k∈Î′\Î
κk ≥ ϕℓ(t
′)+ ∑
i∈Î\Î′
κi + ∑
k∈Î′\Î
ϕk(t
′) (DC)
eℓϕℓ(t)+ ∑
i∈Î\Î′
eiϕi(t)+ ∑
k∈Î′\Î
ekκk < eℓϕℓ(t
′)+ ∑
i∈Î\Î′
eiκi + ∑
k∈Î′\Î
ekϕk(t
′) (EH) .
Assume first that ϕℓ(t)+∑i∈Î\Î′ ϕi(t)≥ ϕℓ(t
′)+∑
i∈Î\Î′
κi. Equivalently, we have
ϕℓ(t)−ϕℓ(t
′)≥ ∑
i∈Î\Î′
(κi−ϕi(t))
and from (26),
eℓ
(
ϕℓ(t)−ϕℓ(t
′)
)
≥ ∑
i∈Î\Î′
ei(κi−ϕi(t)).
By combining the above with the emission levels hypothesis (EH), we obtain the
following contradiction: ∑
k∈Î′\Î
ekκk < ∑k∈Î′\Î ekϕk(t
′).
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Assume now that ϕℓ(t) + ∑i∈Î\Î′ ϕi(t) < ϕℓ(t
′) + ∑
i∈Î\Î′
κi. Multiplying the de-
mand constraint (DC) by eˆ := min{ek,k ∈ Î′ \ Î}, we get
∑
k∈Î′\Î
ek(κk−ϕk(t
′))≥ eˆ
(
ϕℓ(t)−ϕℓ(t
′)
)
+ eˆ ∑
i∈Î\Î′
(κi−ϕi(t))
But from (EH) and (26), we also have
∑
k∈Î′\Î
ek(κk−ϕk(t
′)) < eℓ
(
ϕℓ(t)−ϕℓ(t
′)
)
+ eℓ ∑
i∈Î\Î′
(κi−ϕi(t))
Then
0≥ (eˆ− eℓ)
(
ϕℓ(t)−ϕℓ(t
′)
)
+(eˆ− eℓ) ∑
i∈Î\Î′
(κi−ϕi(t))
which contradicts our assumption.
(i-b) If ∑
i∈I
ϕi(t) < D(t) then, for all i ∈ I, ϕi(t) = κi and (EH) is necessarily false.
We complete the proof of the lemma with the case I′ 6= I in Appendix 5.1. ⊓⊔
3.3.2 Towards an equilibrium strategy
In the following we do not explicit a Nash equilibrium. Instead we establish the ex-
istence of an interval in which the coupled carbon market Nash equilibria evolve.
We demonstrate that there is no possible deviation enabling a Nash equilibrium out-
side the interval establishing the carbon price. This derives from a series of lemmas
in which we explicit the market.
To begin with, we propose an analysis of the three following statements:
Lower price strategy
Consider any strategy AW = (AW1 , . . . ,A
W
J ) such that
AWj (τ) =
{
W j(τ
lower), for 0≤ τ ≤ τ lower
anything admissible, for τ > τ lower.
(27)
Lemma 3.
(i) pCO2(AW )≥ τ lower.
(ii) In the case where pCO2(AW ) = τ lower, there is no unilateral favorable deviation
that clears the market at a CO2 price lower than τ
lower.
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Proof. Point (i) is a consequence of the definition of τ lower = sup{τ ∈ [0,p], s.t. W (τ)>
Ω}. Since AWj (τ) = W j(τ) for τ ≤ τ
lower, it follows that pCO2(AW ) = sup{τ ∈
[0,p], s.t. ∑ jA
W
j (τ) > Ω} ≥ τ
lower.
To prove (ii), first note that, since we assume pCO2(AW ) = τ lower, we have
ϕ j(A
W ) = ϕ j(τ
lower) = 1
e j
W j(τ
lower).
Suppose one producer, say Producer 1, deviates and chooses A˜1(·) instead of
AW1 (·). Suppose the new carbon price τ˜ := p
CO2(AW−1; A˜1)< τ
lower. Since AWj (τ˜
+) =
AWj (τ˜) for j 6= 1, necessarily we have A˜1(τ˜
+) < A˜1(τ˜), by definition of τ˜ . Then
∆(A1) > 0 and it follows that δ1(A
W
−1; A˜1) = δ1(A
W ).
From the fact that the marginal production costs of all Producers have decreased
(the emission cost is τ˜ instead of τ lower), it comes that pelec(AW−1; A˜1)≤ p
elec(AW ).
This means that the part of electricity production capacity that is not covered by
allowances (and hence penalized with p) has a marginal production cost greater
than pelec(AW−1; A˜1)). We then deduce that, at best, ϕ1(A
W
−1; A˜1)≤ ϕ1(A
W ). ⊓⊔
Lemma 4. Suppose A is such that pCO2(A) < τ lower. Then A is not a Nash equilib-
rium.
Proof. To prove this lemma we exhibit an unilateral deviation from A of a producer,
improving its market share on the electricity market.
•Assume first that at least one producer exists, say Producer 1, such that ϕ1(A)<
κ1 and there exists a tax value τˆ1 such that p
CO2(A)< τˆ1 ≤ τ
lower and, W1(τ) = e1κ1
for any τ ∈ [pCO2(A), τˆ1].
This means that Producer 1 may sell κ1, for any tax level τ in [p
CO2(A), τˆ1], and
consequently we have c1 + τe1 < p
elec(τ) for τ in [pCO2(A), τˆ1].
Consider a deviation A˜1 of player 1, such that the resulting clearing price on CO2
market, pCO2(A−1; A˜1) ∈ [p
CO2(A), τˆ1]. From Remark 4, we have
pelec(pCO2(A−1; A˜1))≤ p
elec(A−1; A˜1).
This means that Producer 1 may sell its overall covered capacity: ϕ1(A−1; A˜1) =
1
e1
δ1(A−1; A˜1).
Now we define τ 7→ A˜1(τ) as follows, for ε > 0 arbitrarily small, for p
CO2(A)< τ ,
A˜1(τ) =e1κ1✶{∑
j 6=1
A j(τ)+δ1(A) < Ω}
✶{pCO2(A) < τ ≤ τˆ1}
+
(
Ω − ∑
j>1
A j(τ)− ε
)
✶
{∑
j 6=1
A j(τ)+δ1(A)≥ Ω}
✶{pCO2(A)≤ τ ≤ τˆ1}
+A1(τ)✶{τ > τˆ1}
and
A˜1(p
CO2(A)) =e1κ1.
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Note that A˜1(τ) ≥ A1(τ) for p
CO2(A) ≤ τ ≤ τˆ1, and consequently p
CO2(A−1; A˜1) ≥
pCO2(A).
If pCO2(A−1; A˜1)> p
CO2(A), then e1ϕ1(A−1; A˜1))= δ (A−1; A˜1)> δ (A)≥ e1ϕ1(A),
and we get our favorable deviation.
If pCO2(A−1; A˜1) = p
CO2(A), we observe that when ∆(A1) ≥ 0, we also have
∆(A˜1) = 0. Then by CO2 market clearing mechanism, Producer 1 get e1κ1 al-
lowances instead of δ (A) and strictly improves its electricity market share. when
∆(A1)< 0, we have A˜1(p
CO2(A)+)> A1(p
CO2(A)+), that also insure that Producer 1
increase δ (A−1; A˜1) > δ (A) (see (10)).
• Assume now that all producers are either such that ϕ j(A) = κ j or such that
ϕ j(A) < κ j and W j(p
CO2(A)+) < e jκ j. Among the second category, there ex-
ists at least one producer (say Producer 1) such that ϕ1(A) < ϕ1(p
CO2(A)) with
ϕ1(p
CO2(A))> 0 (unless to contradict pCO2(A)< τ lower). Here we have used the nota-
tion (20) and (21).W1(p
CO2(A)+)< e1κ1 means that c1+e1p
CO2(A) = pelec(pCO2(A))
(as pelec(·) is right-continuous).
A strictly favorable deviation A˜1 of Producer 1, thus consists in increase its ask
at the price pCO2(A)+, in order to increase its δ ((A−1, A˜1)) (see (10)):
A˜1(τ) =
(
Ω − ∑
j>1
A j(τ)− ε
)
✶{pCO2(A) < τ}
+ e1κ1✶{pCO2(A) = τ}.
Then pCO2((A−1; A˜1)) = p
CO2(A), A˜1(p
CO2(A)) ≥ A1(p
CO2(A)), but A˜1(p
CO2(A)+) >
A1(p
CO2(A)+), for ε sufficiently small. This last inequality guaranties that δ1((A−1; A˜1))>
δ1(A) and finally ϕ1(p
CO2(A))≥ ϕ1((A−1; A˜1)) > ϕ1(A). ⊓⊔
High price strategy
Consider any strategy AW = (AW1 , · · · ,A
W
J ) such that
AWj (τ) =
{
anything admissible, for τ ≤ τhigher
W j(τ), for τ > τ
higher.
(28)
Lemma 5.
(i) pCO2(AW )≤ τhigher.
(ii) In the case where pCO2(AW ) = τhigher, there is no unilateral favorable deviation
that clears the market at a CO2 price higher than τ
higher.
Proof. Point (i) follows directly from the definition of τhigher.
To prove (ii), suppose one producer, say Producer 1, chooses its strategy A˜1(·)
instead of AW1 (·), and that the resulting CO2 price is τ˜ := p
CO2(AW−1; A˜1) > τ
higher.
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Necessarily, due to the definition of AW , this means that W 1(τ˜) = 0, which in
turn means that c1 + τ˜e1 > p
elec(τ˜). To conclude, it is sufficient to notice that
any Producer j 6= 1 obtains what he asks for, i.e. δ j(A
W
−1; A˜1) = W j(τ˜
+), from
which it follows that the coupled electricity price equals the taxed electricity price:
pelec(AW−1; A˜1) = p
elec(τ˜), and then ϕ1(A
W
−1; A˜1) = W i(τ˜) = 0 and the deviation of
1 is not favorable. ⊓⊔
Lemma 6. Suppose A is such that pCO2(A) > τhigher. Then A is not a strong Nash
equilibrium.
Proof. Given A, such that pCO2(A) > τhigher, we consider the coalition of produc-
ers K such that for j ∈ K , δ j(A) > 0 whereas W j(p
CO2(A)) = 0. Consider the
following cooperating deviation of K :
A˜ j(·) = A
W
j (·), for j ∈K .
Then pCO2(A−K ; A˜K ) < p
CO2(A) and at least for one member of K , δ j(A) > 0
when W j(p
CO2(A)) > 0. This means that ϕ j(A−K ; A˜K ) > 0 which is a strictly
favorable deviation of j, whereas the situation is unchanged for the others in K
that still produce nothing. We exhibit a coalition that allows a deviation from A that
benefits to all of its members. Then A is not a strong Nash equilibrium. ⊓⊔
Intermediate strategy
Consider any strategy profile B = (B1, · · · ,BJ) satisfying the following:
B j(τ) =

W j(τ), for τ > τ
higher
anything admissible, for τ lower < τ ≤ τhigher
W j(τ
lower), for τ ≤ τ lower.
(29)
This is not in general an equilibrium, nevertheless we have the following properties :
Lemma 7.
(i) pCO2(B) ∈ [τ lower,τhigher].
(ii) If there exists a favorable deviation from a producer, say Producer 1, that
chooses B˜1 instead of B1, such that p
CO2(B−1; B˜1)< τ
lower, then there exists another
favorable deviation B̂1 such that p
CO2(B−1; B̂1)= τ
lower, and such that ϕ1(B−1; B̂1)≥
ϕ1(B−1; B˜1).
Proof. Point (i) follows directly from Lemma 3-(i) and Lemma 5-(i).
To prove point (ii), we denote τB := p
CO2(B−1; B˜1)< τ
lower. We first observe that,
as producers j 6= 1 are served first on the carbon market,
δ1(B˜) = Ω − ∑
j 6=1
W j(τ
lower).
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Define B̂1, the new deviation of 1 as
B̂1 =
{
B˜1(τ), for τ > τ
lower,
W1(τ
lower), for τ ≤ τ lower.
The CO2 price is now fixed to p
CO2((B−1; B̂1)) = τ
lower, and from the CO2 market
mechanism it follows that
δ1((B−1; B̂1))≥ δ1((B−1; B˜1)).
Since B˜ j(τB) = B˜ j(τ
+
B ) = W j(τ
lower) for any j 6= 1, it comes that δ1((B−1; B˜1)) =
Ω −∑ j 6=1W j(τ
lower). Indeed, for strategy (B−1; B̂1), the producers j 6= 1 such that
B j(τ
lower+) < W j(τ
lower) receive a quantity of quotas δ j((B−1; B̂1) ≤ W j(τ
lower),
from which it follows that δ1((B−1; B̂1)) = Ω −∑ j δ j((B−1; B̂1))≥ δ1((B−1; B̂1)).
We also deduce that ϕ1((B−1; B̂1)) =
1
e1
δ1((B−1; B̂1)).
To conclude, it is sufficient to notice that ϕ1((B−1; B̂1)) =
1
e1
δ1((B−1; B̂1)) ≥
1
e1
δ1((B−1; B˜1))≥ ϕ1((B−1; B˜1)). ⊓⊔
The following corollary is a direct consequence of Lemmas 4, 5, 6 and 7.
Corollary 1. Let E be a (strong) Nash equilibrium. Then the following E′ is also a
(strong) Nash equilibrium:
E ′j(τ) =

W j(τ), for τ > τ
higher
E j(τ), for τ
lower < τ ≤ τhigher
W j(τ
lower), for τ ≤ τ lower
(30)
It is worthy of mentioning that same results of the section 3.3 apply when pro-
ducers have an electricity production power plants portfolio, or when one modify
the maximal amount E j of allowances to buy. The interval remain relevant, with
straightforward modification on the functions W j(·) and W j(·) and the related price
bounds τ lower and τhigher.
4 Conclusion
Once CO2 is emitted into the atmosphere, it remains there for more than a century.
Estimating its value is an essential indicator for efficiently defining policy. Carbon
valuation is crucial for designing markets that foster emission reductions. In this
paper, we established the links between an electricity market and a carbon auction
market through an analysis of electricity producers’ strategies. We proved that they
lead to the interval where relevant Nash equilibria evolve, enabling the computation
of equilibrium prices on both markets. It has been established that Nash equilibria
driver on the carbon market rely more on the producers’ emission rate than on their
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marginal costs. For each producer, each equilibrium derives the level of electricity
produced and the CO2 emissions covered.
For a given design and set of players, the information provided by the interval
may be interpreted as a diagnosis of market behavior in terms of prices and volume.
In addition to this analysis of the Nash equilibrium we plan to analyze the elec-
tricity production mix, with a particular focus on renewable shares that do not par-
ticipate in emissions.
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5 Appendix
5.1 End of the proof of Lemma 2
(ii) We examine the situation I(t ′) 6= I(t)
To shorten the expressions, we still adopt the following shorten notation
I(t) = I and I(t ′) = I′.
I(t)∩ I′(t) = II ′
We break down I and I′ into the sets II ′, I\I′ and I′\I. We denote by Î the set of
index i ∈ I such that ci + tei = p(t). In particular, when j ∈ I\Î, then ϕ j(t) = κ j.
We first derive some generic relations between the emission rates for these sets.
Among the indexes in the set II ′, we observe that at most one index exists (say ℓ)
in the set Î∩ Î′. If j ∈ Î\Î′, if k ∈ Î′\Î, then, by the definition of the sets
c j + e jt =cℓ + eℓt
c j + e jt
′ <cℓ + eℓt
′
ck + ekt <c j + e jt
ck + ekt
′ =cℓ + eℓt
′
ck + ekt <cℓ + eℓt
c j + e jt
′ <ck + ekt
from which, we easily deduce that
eˆ := max
{
e j, j ∈ II
′∩
(
Î\Î′
)}
< eℓ <min
{
ek,k ∈ II
′∩
(
Î′\Î
)}
:= eˆ′. (31)
For j ∈ I\I′ and k ∈ I′\I, we have
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c j + e jt < ck + ekt
c j + e jt
′ > ck + ekt
′
from which, we also easily deduce that
max{ek,k ∈ I
′\I}<min{e j, j ∈ I\I
′}. (32)
For the same j and k, for (cˆ, eˆ) representative of index in II ′ ∩ Î \ Î′, and (cˆ′, eˆ′)
representative of index in II ′∩ Î′ \ Î, we also have
c j + e jt ≤ cˆ+ eˆt
c j + e jt
′ > cˆ+ eˆt ′
and
ck + ekt > cˆ
′+ eˆ′t
ck + ekt
′ ≤ cˆ′+ eˆ′t ′
from which, we deduce that
min{e j, j ∈ I\I
′}> (eℓ, eˆ)∨max{ek,k ∈ I
′\I}
max{ek,k ∈ I
′\I}< (eℓ, eˆ
′)∧min{e j, j ∈ I\I
′}.
(33)
We divide your analysis in cases. In the first one the demand is fully satisfied for
the price pelec(t).
(ii-a) If ∑i∈I ϕI(t) = D(p
elec(t))
∑
i∈I\I′
ϕI + ∑
i∈ II ′
ϕi(t) = D(p
elec(t))≥ D(pelec(t ′))≥ ∑
i∈ II ′
ϕi(t
′)+ ∑
i∈I′\I
ϕi(t
′) (DC)
∑
i∈I\I′
ϕi(t)ei + ∑
i∈ II ′
ϕi(t)ei < ∑
i∈ II ′
ϕi(t
′)ei + ∑
i∈I′\I
ϕi(t)ei (EH)
We must then examine the following two subcases, relative to the situations where
the demand is satisfied or not at the price pelec(t ′).
(ii-a-1) If ∑i∈I′ ϕi(t
′) < D(pelec(t ′)), then ϕi(t
′) = κi for all i ∈ I
′ and
∑
j∈I\I′
ϕ j(t)+ ∑
i∈ II ′
ϕi(t) > ∑
i∈ II ′
κi + ∑
k∈I′\I
κk (DC)
∑
j∈I\I′
ϕ j(t)e j + ∑
i∈ II ′
ϕi(t)ei < ∑
i∈ II ′
κiei + ∑
k∈I′\I
κkek (EH)
As ϕi(t) = κi when i ∈ (I\Î)∩ II
′, we can simplify the two sides of (DC) and (EH)
by the sum over (I\Î)∩ II ′. The remaining part of II ′ is {ℓ}∪
(
Î\Î′∩ II ′
)
:
∑
j∈I\I′
ϕ j(t)+ϕℓ + ∑
i∈Î\Î′∩ II ′
ϕi(t) > κℓ + ∑
i∈Î\Î′∩ II ′
κi + ∑
k∈I′\I
κk (DC)
∑
j∈I\I′
e jϕ j(t)+ eℓϕℓ + ∑
i∈Î\Î′∩ II ′
eiϕi(t) < eℓκℓ + ∑
i∈Î\Î′∩ II ′
eiκi + ∑
k∈I′\I
ekκk (EH)
Then, we multiply (DC) by e¯ := (eℓ, eˆ)∨max{ek,k ∈ I
′\I}, and we obtain by (33)
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∑
j∈I\I′
e jϕ j(t)+ e¯ϕℓ + e¯ ∑
i∈Î\Î′∩ II ′
ϕi(t) > e¯κℓ + e¯ ∑
i∈Î\Î′∩ II ′
κi + ∑
k∈I′\I
ekκk.
We subtract with (EH) :
(e¯− eℓ)ϕℓ + ∑
i∈Î\Î′∩ II ′
(e¯− ei)ϕi(t) > (e¯− eℓ)κℓ + ∑
i∈Î\Î′∩ II ′
(e¯− ei)κi.
But e¯ ≥ eℓ when ℓ exists, and e¯ ≥ eˆ ≥ ei for i ∈ Î\Î′∩ II
′. So we obtain our contra-
diction.
(ii-a-2) If ∑i∈I′ ϕi(t
′) = D(pelec(t ′)), then
∑
j∈I\I′
ϕ j(t)+ ∑
i∈ II ′
ϕi(t) > ∑
i∈ II ′
ϕi(t
′)+ ∑
k∈I′\I
ϕk(t
′) (DC)
∑
j∈I\I′
ϕ j(t)e j + ∑
i∈ II ′
ϕi(t)ei < ∑
i∈ II ′
ϕi(t
′)ei + ∑
k∈I′\I
ϕk(t
′)ek. (EH)
We decompose I\I′ =
(
I\(I′∪ Î)
)
∪ Î\I′ and I′\I =
(
I′\(I∪ Î′)
)
∪ Î′\I:
∑
j∈I\(I′∪Î)
κ j + ∑
j∈Î\I′
ϕ j(t)+ ∑
i∈ II ′
ϕi(t)
> ∑
i∈ II ′
ϕi(t
′)+ ∑
k∈Î′\I
ϕk(t
′)+ ∑
k∈I′\(I∪Î′)
κk (DC)
∑
j∈I\(I′∪Î)
e jκ j + ∑
j∈Î\I′
e jϕ j(t)+ ∑
i∈ II ′
eiϕi(t)
< ∑
i∈ II ′
eiϕi(t
′)+ ∑
k∈Î′\I
ekϕk(t
′)+ ∑
k∈I′\(I∪Î′)
ekκk. (EH)
We also break down the set II ′ = (I∩ I′):
II ′ =
(
II ′∩{ℓ}
)
∪
(
II ′∩ Î\Î′
)
∪
(
II ′∩ Î′\Î
)
∪
(
I\Î∩ I′\Î′)
)
.
∑
j∈I\(I′∪Î))
κ j + ∑
j∈Î\I′
ϕ j(t)+ϕℓ(t)+ ∑
i∈Î\Î′∩ II ′
ϕi(t)+ ∑
i∈Î′\Î∩ II ′
ϕi(t)
> ϕℓ(t
′)+ ∑
i∈Î\Î′∩ II ′
ϕi(t
′)+ ∑
i∈Î′\Î∩ II ′
ϕi(t
′)+ ∑
k∈Î′\I
ϕk(t
′)+ ∑
k∈I′\(I∪Î′)
κk (DC)
∑
j∈I\(I′∪Î)
e jκ j + ∑
j∈Î\I′
e jϕ j(t)+ eℓϕℓ(t)+ ∑
i∈Î\Î′∩ II ′
eiϕi(t)+ ∑
i∈Î′\Î∩ II ′
eiϕi(t)
< eℓϕℓ(t
′)+ ∑
i∈Î\Î′∩ II ′
eiϕi(t
′)+ ∑
i∈Î′\Î∩ II ′
eiϕi(t
′)+ ∑
k∈Î′\I
ekϕk(t
′)+ ∑
k∈I′\(I∪Î′)
ekκk (EH)
30 M. Bossy, N. Maïzi and O. Pourtallier
For index i in the last subset (I\Î∩ I′\Î′), we have ϕi(t) = κi and ϕi(t
′) = κi, so we
simplify (DC) and (EH) from this last subset. Thus,
∑
j∈I\(I′∪Î)
κ j + ∑
j∈Î\I′
ϕ j(t)+ϕℓ(t)+ ∑
i∈Î\Î′∩ II ′
ϕi(t)+ ∑
i∈Î′\Î∩ II ′
κi
> ϕℓ(t
′)+ ∑
i∈Î\Î′∩ II ′
κi + ∑
i∈Î′\Î∩ II ′
ϕi(t
′)+ ∑
k∈Î′\I
ϕk(t
′)+ ∑
k∈I′\(I∪Î′)
κk (DC)
∑
j∈I\(I′∪Î)
e jκ j + ∑
j∈Î\I′
e jϕ j(t)+ eℓϕℓ(t)+ ∑
i∈Î\Î′∩ II ′
eiϕi(t)+ ∑
i∈Î′\Î∩ II ′
eiκi
< eℓϕℓ(t
′)+ ∑
i∈Î\Î′∩ II ′
eiκi + ∑
i∈Î′\Î∩ II ′
eiϕi(t
′)+ ∑
k∈Î′\I
ekϕk(t
′)+ ∑
k∈I′\(I∪Î′
ekκk (EH)
We multiply (DC) by e¯ := (eℓ, eˆ)∨max{ek,k ∈ I
′\I} , we get by (33)
∑
j∈I\(I′∪Î)
e jκ j + ∑
j∈Î\I′
e jϕ j(t)+ e¯ϕℓ(t)+ e¯ ∑
i∈Î\Î′∩ II ′
ϕi(t)+ e¯ ∑
i∈Î′\Î∩ II ′
κi
> e¯ϕℓ(t
′)+ e¯ ∑
i∈Î\Î′∩ II ′
κi + e¯ ∑
i∈Î′\Î∩ II ′
ϕi(t
′)+ ∑
k∈Î′\I
ekϕk(t
′)+ ∑
k∈I′\(I∪Î′
ekκk
We subtract (EH)
(e¯− eℓ)ϕℓ(t)+ ∑
i∈Î\Î′∩ II ′
(e¯− ei)ϕi(t)+ ∑
i∈Î′\Î∩ II ′
(e¯− ei)κi
> (e¯− eℓ)ϕℓ(t
′)+ ∑
i∈Î\Î′∩ II ′
(e¯− ei)κi + ∑
i∈Î′\Î∩ II ′
(e¯− ei)ϕi(t
′)
We arrange the terms
(e¯− eℓ)ϕℓ(t)+ ∑
i∈Î\Î′∩ II ′
(e¯− ei)ϕi(t)+ ∑
i∈Î′\Î∩ II ′
(e¯− ei)κi
> (e¯− eℓ)ϕℓ(t
′)+ ∑
i∈Î\Î′∩ II ′
(e¯− ei)κi + ∑
i∈Î′\Î∩ II ′
(e¯− ei)ϕi(t
′)
If ℓ exists, then e¯ = eℓ and
∑
i∈Î′\Î∩ II ′
(eℓ− ei)
(
κi−ϕi(t
′)
)
> ∑
i∈Î\Î′∩ II ′
(eℓ− ei)(κi−ϕi(t))
∑
i∈Î′\Î∩ II ′
(eℓ− eˆ
′)
(
κi−ϕi(t
′)
)
> ∑
i∈Î\Î′∩ II ′
(eℓ− eˆ)(κi−ϕi(t)) .
(34)
But eˆ< eℓ < eˆ
′, and the contradiction follows.
If ℓ does not exist, then e¯ = eˆ∨max{ek,k ∈ I
′\I}
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∑
i∈Î′\Î∩ II ′
(e¯− ei)
(
κi−ϕi(t
′)
)
> ∑
i∈Î\Î′∩ II ′
(e¯− ei)(κi−ϕi(t))
∑
i∈Î′\Î∩ II ′
(e¯− eˆ′)
(
κi−ϕi(t
′)
)
> ∑
i∈Î\Î′∩ II ′
(e¯− eˆ)(κi−ϕi(t))
(35)
But max{ek,k ∈ I
′\I}< eˆ′, and the contradiction follows.
(ii-b) If ∑i∈I ϕi(t) < D(p
elec(t)) then for all i ∈ I, ϕi(t) = κi.
(ii-b 1) If ∑i∈I′ ϕi(t
′)<D(pelec(t ′)), then ϕi(t
′) = κi for all i∈ I
′. Moreover, we have
that O (t, p(t))≥ D(p(t))+ ε)≥ D(p(t ′)) > O (t ′, p(t ′)) and (DC)-(EH) becomes
∑
j∈I\I′
κ j > ∑
k∈I′\I
κk (DC)
∑
j∈I\I′
e jκ j < ∑
k∈I′\I
ekκk (EH)
Then, we multiply (DC) by min{e j; j ∈ I\I
′} ≥max{ek;k ∈ I
′\I}, and we obtain a
contradiction with (EH).
(ii-b-2) If ∑i∈I′ ϕi(t
′) = D(pelec(t ′)), we go back to the analysis of the case (ii-a-
2), with the main difference that all quantities ϕi(t) are now equal to κi. We go to
inequalities (34) and (35) which are simplified as the right-had sides are now zero.
The contradiction follows with the same arguments.
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